Introduction. Views of a prominent British legal thinker Herbert Hart (1907 Hart ( -1992 (1958) as basic relevant texts; etc. Similar viewpoints are also present in Russian legal literature (Didikin, Ogleznev, 2012; Drobyshevskiy, 2015; Kozlikhin, Poliakov, Timoshina, 2015; Martyshyn, 2016; Moyiseyev, 2004; etc. (Hart, 1983b; 1983c; 1994, Postscript) ).
Separation of Law and Morals
Being interrelated with each other and having conditional borders, these stages though differ in disciplinary types, goals, theses, arguments, discursive apparatus, so issues of indeterminacy appear in various contexts, forms, plays various roles, etc. (Kasatkin, 2014, ch. 3 § 2) .
The first stage is associated with the 1949 philosophical essay, Ascription of Responsibility and Rights (Hart, 1949) . Here H.L.A. Hart defends exact definitions and a broad judicial discretion (Kasatkin, 2016b) .
The second stage is connected with H.L.A.
Hart's 1953-1957 essays: Definition and Theory
in Jurisprudence (Hart, 1983a) , Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence in Britain (1945-1952 ) , Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence (Hart, 1955) , Analytical
Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A
Reply to Professor Bodenheimer (Hart, 1957) .
In these papers the author elaborates his own Hart, 1958; 1994; Kasatkin, 2012; 2016a) . (In this period Hart also clearly demonstrates nonidentity of legal reasoning to logical deduction (Hart, 1958, s. III; , and formulates a doctrine of (judicial) discretion as a rational responsible choice in indeterminacy situations -a doctrine that didn't receive his further elaboration, being claimed in expanded form in the author's "lost" and recently discovered 1956
essay Discretion (Hart, 2013) and, quite briefly, in 1958 essay (Hart, 1958, s. III) ). Third, to Hart's doctrine of indeterminacy in law could be attributed a complex structure.
Conclusion.
The doctrine proceeds at different "levels": (a) ones of methodology and subject-matter (which could as well be found in chapters 1 and 7 of The (Hart, 1994) ); (b) of legal theory and legal practice / practical ideology (present in Hart's discussion of a "formalist fallacy" (Hart, 1958, s. III) ). Moreover, being primary and mainly a descriptive conception, the author's doctrine could incorporate some normative or policy arguments (e.g., considerations as to a clear theoretical and practical explanation (Hart, 1958a, s. I-III; 1958, s. I-III) , a need for balance between determinacy and indeterminacy in legal system and justification of a moderate discretion (Hart, 1994, ch. 7) , as to possible limits of stretching language in adjudication (Hart, 1960, s. V), etc. Hart prefers to talk of "core" and "penumbra" of a meaning or of "clear" and "borderline" cases of applying terms / rules (Hart, 1957; 1958) 1949, 1953-1957 и 1958-1961 
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